Challanges to Security in Space
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Space Reliance In An Era Of Competition And Expansion
Capabilities. Space-based capabilities impact many day-to-day aspects of the American way of life. These capabilities enable functions that affect our homes, transportation, electric power grids, banking systems, and global communications. Satellites provide access to a broad range of information and enable many services in real-time, from watching breaking news to monitoring our deployed armed forces around the world day or night. These and other benefits enabled by space systems result from more than 60 years of dedicated work by government agencies—military and civilian—supported by many commercial space providers. Space systems also enable the United States and our allies to project combat power to areas of conflict and instability and allow our armed forces to collect vital intelligence on foreign threats, navigate and maneuver rapidly, and communicate with each other anywhere around the globe to ensure our security and quick response to international military and humanitarian crises.
Competition. Space competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union began in earnest with Moscow’s launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, in 1957. China’s emergence as a space power in the late 20th and early 21st century and Russia’s post-Soviet resurgence have expanded the militarization of space as both countries integrate space and counter-space capabilities into their national and warfighting strategies to challenge the United States. Adversaries have observed more than 30 years of U.S. military operations supported by space systems. They are now seeking ways to expand their own capabilities and deny the U.S. a space-enabled advantage.
China and Russia, in particular, are developing various means to exploit the perceived U.S. reliance on space-based systems and challenge the U.S. position in the space domain. Beijing and Moscow seek to position themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space norms. They aspire to undercut U.S. global leadership through the use of space and counter-space capabilities. Iran and North Korea will continue to develop and operate electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to deny or degrade space-based communications and navigation.
Proliferation. Space capabilities are increasing across a growing list of nations, including missile warning, geolocation and tracking of friendly and adversary activities, target identification, and navigation services for their citizens and armed forces. Expanding constellations of remote-sensing satellites are reducing all countries' ability to conceal sensitive tests, evaluation activities, and military exercises and operations.
Space commercialization is also growing as companies augment or replace government-provided launch, communications, SSA, remote-sensing—also referred to as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)— and human spaceflight services. These firms are opening access to space technologies, services, and products to government and nongovernment entities that can pay for their capabilities. The growth of viable commercial space enterprises best represents how the use of space has expanded in scope, scale, and importance across the globe.
Counterspace. Space is being increasingly militarized. Some nations have developed, tested, and deployed various satellites and some counter-space weapons. China and Russia are developing new space systems to improve their military effectiveness and reduce any reliance on U.S. space systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS). Beijing and Moscow have also created separate space forces. As China’s and Russia’s space and counter-space capabilities increase, both nations are integrating space scenarios into their military exercises. They continue to develop, test, and proliferate sophisticated antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to hold U.S. and allied space assets at risk. At the same time, China and Russia are pursuing nonweaponization of space agreements in the United Nations.9 Russia regularly expresses concern about space weapons and is pursuing legal, binding space arms control agreements to curb what it sees as U.S. strength in outer space. The expansion of Chinese and Russian space and counter-space weapons combined with the general rise of other foreign space capabilities is driving many nations to formalize their space policies to better position themselves to secure the space domain and facilitate their own space services.
Collisions. The probability of collisions of massive derelict objects in low Earth orbit (LEO) is growing and almost certainly will continue through at least 2030 because of rising numbers of space launches— especially those with multiple payloads—and continuing fragmentation from collisions, battery explosions, and further ASAT testing events.
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